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Introduction
Are you ready for a major radiological or nuclear incident, and
do you need to be?
Since the end of the Cold War preparations for dealing with
major nuclear incidents have declined. Unless a hospital has
a nuclear reactor nearby, it is unlikely that radiological
incidents will feature high on the major incident plan.
Recently, health protection agencies have again started to
provide guidance on these issues, following a perceived
heightened threat from terrorism [1–3]. The purpose of this
article is to demystify the risks and describe the extra actions
that should be considered.
The risks of an incident
The risk of a nuclear explosion – the ‘nuclear bomb’ – is
remote; such an incident could either be due to terrorist activity
or result from the actions of ‘rogue’ nation states. However,
highly enriched uranium or plutonium can be made into a
nuclear explosive device relatively easily. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has listed 17 incidents of illicit
trafficking of highly enriched uranium or plutonium over the past
10 years [4], and so there is a substantial mass of material that
is unaccounted for and thus theoretically available. The risk is
therefore present, the numbers of people affected would be
substantial, and the potential consequences of any such
incident would be great. The incident would present as a
massive explosion, with a large blast area and patients
presenting with blast and burn injuries.
Overall, the IAEA has recorded 540 incidents of illicit
trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials during the past
10 years, of which the vast majority of cases involved material
in the sub-giga-Becquerel range (i.e. unenriched). Although
not employable in a nuclear bomb, this material could be
utilized in crude radiological dispersion devices – the ‘dirty
bomb’. However, this remains a rather unlikely scenario. Were
it to occur, the health consequences of the radiological
element are likely to be very small. Such a scenario is likely to
present as a conventional explosive incident, with casualties
presenting with blast and burn injuries. Any radiological
element is unlikely to be a feature of the clinical presentation
and may be picked up late.
More likely radiological threats to the population arise from
accidental releases from energy production installations or
research nuclear reactors, or accidents involving vehicles that
rely on nuclear propulsion (e.g. satellites coming out of orbit,
nuclear submarines, etc.). The highest worldwide risk to
individuals is from medicine itself; nearly half of all fatal
exposures have been due to calibration errors in equipment
used for medical treatment or because of insecure storage of
spent radiotherapy sources [5]. These incidents often present
with clusters of people with burns without an obvious cause.
The health effects
The perception of the risks to health from radiation does not
appear justified by the reality. For example, cohort studies of
the 50,000 survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic
bombs [6] estimated that only 10% of the 4000 subsequent
cancer deaths that occurred between 1950 and 1990 were
due to the radiation. Following the accident at Chernobyl there
has thus far been no clear excess in leukaemia, congenital
abnormalities, or other radiation-associated diseases, although
there is evidence of an increase in thyroid cancer [7].
The effect on a person depends on their resistance to the
radiation effects; the intensity, duration and type of the
radiation; and the chemical characteristics of the material
involved. Most clinicians will be aware that iodine
accumulates in the thyroid gland and so it affects this gland
the most. Few will know that strontium and plutonium
accumulate on bone surfaces; plutonium, ruthenium and
cerium have particular effects on the lungs; and ruthenium
and cerium have effects on the gastrointestinal tract [8]. The
types of radiation particles emitted also have an influence on
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health. For example, α particles can have a substantial local
effect (e.g. on the skin or gastrointestinal tract if ingested) but
do not have effects beyond that; β radiation may penetrate a
few centimetres; and γ and x-ray radiation may penetrate the
whole body, depending on the dose. The types of radiation
emitted depend on the radiation source involved. For
example,  α emitters include radium, radon, uranium and
thorium; strontium-90 and tritium emit β radiation; and iodine-
131 is a γ emitter. With these provisos, high-dose radiation
exposure would have the following early signs and symptoms
[5] due to direct cellular death:
1. Nausea, vomiting, weakness and fatigue within hours to
days.
2. A falling lymphocyte count starts within hours. The rate of
decline is an effective method of quantifying the size of
the radiation dose received. The risk of sepsis is highest
between the 25th and 35th days.
3. Fever and diarrhoea also occur in this time frame if there
have been sufficiently large doses.
4. Following this early phase, infection, bleeding and
gastrointestinal symptoms occur.
Ultimately, the diagnosis of radiation sickness is a clinical
diagnosis and does not rely on Geiger counters, although
these devices may play a role in identifying contamination in
the emergency room.
The management of individual patients
The UK National Health Service major incident planning
guidance [9] emphasizes that the ‘treatment of life-
threatening injury should take priority over monitoring or
decontamination where there is contamination with a
radioactive substance only.’ The reason for this is that the risk
to staff from radiological contamination on or in a patient is
very low indeed. Thus, managing a radiological incident is
theoretically much more straightforward than one that may
involve biological or chemical agents.
Initial triage of patients should therefore follow advanced
trauma life support and major incident guidelines as
appropriate [10,11]. The time interval between exposure and
vomiting can be useful as a triage tool for those physically
uninjured by any blast [5]. If the person vomited within an hour,
then they are likely to have received a large dose of radiation
and should be managed in a centre with radiopathology
expertise. If vomiting occurs 1–2 hours after exposure, then a
hospital ward with haematology experience is most
appropriate; and if vomiting starts beyond 2 hours then
surveillance on a general hospital ward is advised. If the patient
does not vomit then outpatient surveillance is acceptable.
In practice, most institutions will not have an initial response
sophisticated enough to respond in differing ways to the
various nonconventional threats (i.e. biological, chemical, or
radiological). Thus, most hospitals will activate a plan that will
involve decontaminating walk-in casualties before allowing
them into the emergency department. However, once the
initial confusion has settled, active management of the
response should remove unnecessary delays in treatment.
Without prejudicing the treatment of traumatic injury, the main
specific preventative measure for patients involved in a
radiological incident is decontamination. This may have already
been done by the emergency services close to the scene (near
the ‘hot’ zone), or may be performed just before casualties enter
the hospital. In the case of people with life-threatening
conditions this may be delayed until after initial management.
The most important element of decontamination is removal of
the person’s clothes. Where possible casualties should do this
for themselves, but they may be assisted by health care staff.
Ideally, the health care staff involved in this will wear full
protective clothing, but a study has shown that a surgical mask
and careful removal of clothes to prevent aerosolization did not
lead to contamination of health care workers [3]. The risk of
aerosolization can be reduced by gently dampening the clothes
before removal, cutting rather than pulling off the clothes, and
immediately placing the clothes in a plastic bag and sealing it.
The second element of decontamination is a shower, with
copious quantities of water. This is particularly challenging in the
case of critically ill patients. A thorough wash, using standard
precautions, will suffice but decontamination units should have
facilities for recumbent casualties.
A further possible specific counter-measure is the issue of
stable iodine tablets, which is only of benefit where a release
of radioactive iodine has occurred. This is seen with the
detonation of nuclear weapons and major accidental release
from nuclear reactors. The iodine works by saturating iodine-
binding sites in the thyroid before radio-iodine can bind, thus
reducing the accumulating radiation exposure to the thyroid.
Stable iodine will not prevent any other radiation effects.
Health protection organizations will provide advice on this. In
the UK there are supplies of stable iodine at nuclear reactor
sites and at other locations; other countries have adopted
similar public health strategies.
The overall management of a radiological
incident
Governments and health protection organizations throughout
Europe have plans for such incidents. Depending on the size
of the incident, there may be international (e.g World Health
Organization, IAEA, European Union), national, regional and
local coordinated responses that rely on the cooperation from
many different sectors, including the military, local
government, nuclear installations, the emergency services and
the health service. Experts will rapidly disseminate information
for clinicians tailored to what is known about the exposures.
This is likely to evolve over the first few hours after an incident.
As the acute phase of the incident wanes, careful consideration
will be given to any further actions required. Depending on the
extent and type of radiation, a decision will be made on whether225
remediation or semipermanent evacuation is required for the
safety of the population [12]. Later on, public health authorities
will consider the need for enhanced surveillance, screening
services and increased treatment capacity.
The real problem
The risks of a major radiological incident are low, the short-
term health consequences from the radiation are likely to be
minimal, and the management is relatively straightforward.
Nevertheless, challenges would occur, and the main problems
that an intensivist would face would be in keeping the
intensive care service operating efficiently. With the centre of
a city contaminated, transportation systems would potentially
be in disarray. Some staff may elect not to come to work or
may have been advised to evacuate the area around their
homes, in which case they would naturally prefer to care for
their families. For those staff intending to work, transport in
and out of and around the hospital would be severely affected.
Logistic networks would also be impaired, and, given the
current enthusiasm for ‘just in time’ stores management,
essential consumables would soon run short. Patients and
staff flows around the hospital should be severely curtailed to
prevent the spread of low-level contamination.
Thus, the impact on an intensive care service may be more
from organizational and logistical disruption in the
management of ‘normal’ patients than from the incident itself.
Disruption in community care is likely to lead to more
pressure on services from patients with chronic conditions,
such as dialysis-dependent renal failure or domiciliary
respiratory support [13–15].
Useful steps to take to be prepared
The six key elements of being prepared are as follows:
1. Ensure that staff (and the rest of the hospital) are aware
of the need to treat sick patients as normal following a
radiological incident. They need reassurance, before the
event, that they will be at a low risk if they do this.
2. Consider how the hospital will be able to continue to
receive important information from health protection
agencies as it becomes available.
3. Ensure the hospital’s major incident planners have given
thought to patient and staff flows that would minimize any
contamination. This should include the routes between
the emergency and operating rooms, intensive care and
the decontamination facilities.
4. Give prior thought to how many patients you could
provide support to in the event of being unable to
transport patients to other providers, and have robust
expansion plans.
5. Consider how intensive care departments can support
the rest of the hospital in providing a seamless high-
quality service for everyone throughout a major
radiological incident.
6. Anticipate the delivery of service in a logistically chaotic
situation.
Conclusion
The risk of a radiological terrorist incident is low.
Nevertheless, the working through of such scenarios and the
conducting of ‘desktop’ exercises may prove to be a useful
investment in time. Our original question was, do you need to
be prepared? The answer is for the individual reader.
However, even if a radiological threat is not felt to be an
immediate local hazard, many other man-made or natural
disaster scenarios would produce similar logistical
headaches, and it makes sense for us all to anticipate these.
Interested readers should refer to Farmer and coworkers [16]
for more in-depth discussion of the issues considered here.
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